The Art of Intelligence Lessons From a Life in Cias Clandestine Service

The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Hugger-mugger Service
past Henry A. Crumpton
327 pages, The Penguin Press, $17

This volume is not the unvarnished "truth" of a complex situation, but a well-stated perspective for one of the sides, and as a result volition serve as a primary research source for that position.

Henry A. Crumpton served in the CIA and headed the post-9/11 counter-terrorism effort in the United states of america. His book is half-memoir, half-policy statement which reveals the objectives and methods used in Afghanistan and against terrorism. These were muddied by the media, and while this book presents only ane side of the picture, it does and so clearly in text that would hands interpret to bullet points.

The memoir half of the book starts out with an outline of important tasks in the field of intelligence, and for each point it provides three anecdotes. These are stripped of all identifying information but very artfully reveal the author's bespeak nonetheless. His approach to intelligence is one of data gathering, source tillage and a steady frustration of the goals of the opposition. The indicate is fabricated repeatedly that intelligence is a hybrid of politics and military machine strategy, in which convincing an opponent to act in a certain way, or that their efforts have come to null, is as much victory as a battlefield supremacy can ever be.

From these observations Crumpton outlines intelligence work from the viewpoint of a policy maker. Although none of what he says is classified, he presents it in a articulate form that allows the reader to slowly absorb the implications of what he is reading. This type of revelation does non occur in the mainstream media.

Founded in 1947, NSA built a global network of collection systems to snatch data transmitted through the atmosphere. At NSA headquarters, thousands of brilliant officers deciphered, translated, and analyzed the intercepted texts. Culling through millions of messages over decades, NSA produced unprecedented reporting both in quantity and in quality. The appearance of cyberspace, however, challenged NSA's collection abilities…NSA struggled to reinvent itself, pursuing SIGINT non only in the atmosphere only also in fiber-optic cables and in databases. (79)

In the second section of the volume, Crumpton attempts to not merely explain and justify, but praise American policy in Afghanistan. He walks his readers through the early encounters with al-Qaeda, and how pre-9/11 intelligence was disorganized. Then into Transitional islamic state of afghanistan the CIA goes in full strength, almost overnight forming an army out of political enemies of AQ and using it to bulldoze them out of local political command. Crumpton makes the fragile point that while Iraq was an invasion, in Afghanistan the function was to counter an invasion by Taliban, AQ and assorted radicals.

The author is not unaware of how many people have doubts about American foreign policy and intervention. Every bit a result, the movie that emerges here is blunt and often highlights the cool, but states clearly the clashing goals of the various parties. AQ is seen as a radicalizing extremist element and the United States every bit a keeper of residue. On the whole, this seems accurate; Crumpton falls brusk of saying that the Us is an imperial power because it keeps stability worldwide, and instead deviates slightly into the usual voter-pandering about freedom and democracy, etc., which he invariably reveals as bunk by immediate afterward talking nigh the practical changes in peoples' lives. His ongoing crypto-theme appears to be on the topic of using policy to raise the standard of living and thus bring stability where otherwise a tinderbox existed.

George Westward. Bush-league features slightly in this piece of work and is treated with respect, just not much detail. The report is not negative, and while somewhat positive, isn't raving in support of Bush-league either. Withal, it'south far from the media mantra of how terrible Bush was. Crumpton is less kind to those such as Paul Wolfowitz, who he sees every bit redirecting focus from Afghanistan to Republic of iraq for unseen political goals. Information technology's possible that those goals were entirely legitimate, such as denying a resource nexus to potential enemies, simply history has not still revealed this. In contrast to the Iraq police force action, Crumpton reveals clear goals of the American counter-terrorism strategy.

"What are our strategic objectives?" I asked Frank.

"There are iii," he responded. "First, we must destroy AQ leadership. 2d, nosotros must deny them safe haven. Tertiary, we must assail the political-social-economical conditions the enemy exploits." Typical. He boiled down circuitous problems and plans into a few unproblematic declarative sentences. (177)

When the action in Transitional islamic state of afghanistan wound down, Crumpton took a twelvemonth off to get his MA in political science. He basically attributes this determination to his unwillingness to ride along with an assistants that was focusing less on Transitional islamic state of afghanistan and more on Iraq. He writes convincingly about how academia, like government, mistakes intelligence for a minor function when it is more properly viewed as the eyes and ears of the modern land. During this fourth dimension, he collaborated with newfound bookish allies to write a book of policy.

On Iraq, Crumpton mentions how inexplainable information technology was that Wolfowitz was then determined to assault Hussein. As mentioned in the text, Hussein was not friendly to al-Qaeda and in fact wanted to keep his dictatorship secular. All the same, he was a supporter of terrorism — in Palestine — then like some zombie restoration of 1980s American policy, the agenda came to include attacking him (188). Crumpton does not seem opposed to attacking Iraq so much as to shifting energy to an Iraq war when the counter-terrorism policy goals lay elsewhere. History volition evidence who was right.

In doing and then, he becomes an unwitting spokesman for globalism, which with free-market principles formed the real enemy of the terrorists (292). Yet, this is in in Crumpton-speak a means to the end of achieving stability and a ameliorate standard of life. Time volition besides tell here. What is interesting virtually this is that despite the keen volumes of text written about the American war against terrorism, very few were able to lay it out in objective and logical form as nosotros meet information technology here.

This book provides quality coincidental reading for those interested in espionage, or the war against terror during its early on days, from someone who had a ringside seat (every bit U.S. coordinator for counter-terrorism efforts). Information technology does non attempt to provide a well-rounded perspective and is clearer for that, only as a result cannot on its ain provide a clear view of the situation, only a forceful statement of purpose from one of the participants.

Tags: Books, primal intelligence agency, henry a. crumpton, national security agency

Share on Facebook Share on Reddit Tweet about this on Twitter Share on LinkedIn